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NON-OBVIOUSNESS: THE FULCRUM OF COMBINATION
PATENT VALIDITY
INTRODUCTION

Current patent law requires an inventor to demonstrate an invention
is novel,' useful, 2 and non-obvious 3 for issuance of a valid patent.4 Assuming the elements of utility5 and novelty 6 are satisfied for the "combination patent ' 7 at issue, the validity of the combination patent claim will
teeter on the fulcrum of the non-obviousness doctrine.
In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,8 the United States Supreme Court held that inventors who apply for combination patents must
satisfy a two-pronged test for non-obviousness to obtain a valid combination patent. 9 The first prong merges two Supreme Court tests: (1) the
original "synergy" test,' 0 where issuance of a combination patent is prohibited if a court or patent examiner determines the claimed subject matter was objectively obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent
art;" and (2) the Graham test, 12 examining relevant secondary factors of
obviousness. The second prong is the "teaching, suggestion, or motivation" (TSM) test 3 developed by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 14 as a soft standard to provide insight into patent claims.' 5 In the
context of combination patents, this dual-pronged analysis for nonobviousness provides a broad approach to patent validity. Overall, the
Teleflex Court established a synthesized test that will affect patent law in
legal, social, and economic ways.
1. Tamir Packin, A New Test for Obviousness in Combination Patents: Economic Synergy,
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 957, 958 (2006); see also 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (2007) (stating "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent ....).
2.
Packin, supra note 1, at 958, n.10 (stating the inventor must prove the invention "is new
and that he invented it before anyone else"); see also 35 U.S.C.A. § 102 (2007).
3.
See 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (2007).
4.
Packin, supra note 1, at 964 (citing 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-03 (2007)).
5. Id.at 959 n. 12 (stating the three part test to prove the utility element).
6.
Id.at 959 n.13 (stating combination patents by definition are novel and therefore satisfy
the novelty element).
7.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1157 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a combination patent as a
"patent granted for an invention that unites existing components in a novel way").
8.
127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007).
9.
See id. at 1734.
10.
See infra Part l.B. I for a discussion of the Court's synergy test.
11.
See Teleflex, 127 S.Ct. at 1734.
12. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
13. See discussion infra Part 1.B.3.
14. See infra p. 491 and note 69 (stating the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals merged
with the United States Court of Claims in 1982 to form the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit).
15.
See Teleflex, 127 S.Ct. at 1734.
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Part I of this comment will examine the development of the nonobviousness doctrine by Congress and the courts. Part II will summarize
the facts of Teleflex and the Supreme Court's holding. Part III will first
argue that, on its face, Teleflex clarified the analysis for combination
patent issuance. Additionally, it will argue that the Court's emphasis on
a broad non-obviousness standard actually will produce legal, social, and
economic benefits, along with some negative impacts on small businesses and independent innovators. However, further congressional legislation is necessary to streamline non-obviousness analysis. Accordingly, Part IV suggests Congress should intervene to clarify the nonobviousness analysis because this determination involves a policy discussion more appropriately suited for Congress. Finally, this comment
concludes that the Court's interpretation of the non-obviousness doctrine
will promote innovation in combination patents while rewarding worthy
inventors with exclusive patent rights, but this policy decision should be
addressed by Congress, not the Court.
I. THE RISE OF THE NoN-OBVIOUSNESs DOCTRINE
Fundamentally, the thrust of the non-obviousness doctrine is an economic policy striking a balance between encouiraging innovation and
protecting the public from monopolistic patent rights.1 6 Throughout U.S.
patent law history, the non-obviousness requirement evolved slowly,
reflecting uneasiness in general judicial application. 7 In a similar vein,
determining non-obviousness for combination patents is particularly
problematic because such patents involve combining existing elements,
or "prior art," 18 to form a novel invention.19 As background, the following two sections will provide the legislative history and the judicial interpretation of the non-obviousness doctrine.
A. LegislativeHistory
Under its explicit power articulated in the Patent Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, 20 Congress historically passed patent legislation to promote
innovation, while simultaneously attempting to limit the grant of patent
rights to new and useful inventions worthy of the "monopolies [that]
produce more embarrassment than advantage to society."'21 Although the
well established patentability elements historically included novelty and
16.
Packin, supra note 1, at 962-67.
17.
Id.at 963 n.43.
18. id. at 957 n.2 (defining prior art as "[a]n invention that is already known"); see also
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 7, at 119 (defining prior art as "knowledge ...that is available.., at a given time to a person of ordinary skill in [the] art ....
19.
35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (2007).
20.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.1, 8 (stating "Congress shall have Power... To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
21.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 326, 334 (Andrew A. Lipscomb et al. eds., 1903).
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utility, 22 U.S. statutory patent law did not formally address obviousness
until 1952.23 In the absence of statutory guidance, the Supreme Court
interpreted the non-obviousness doctrine in case law.24 The Court most
plainly stated the "long
discussed" 25 non-obviousness standard in Hotch26
kiss v. Greenwood.
In Hotchkiss, the plaintiffs held a patent for metallic knobs and sued
"the defendants for the alleged infringement of a patent for a new and
useful improvement in making door and other knobs of all kinds of clay.
and of porcelain[,]" instead of metal.27 The Court explained that,
[n]o one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of
materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the
materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one; or, 28
in the
sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.
Simply, the Court held that merely substituting the material of a product
is obvious, and therefore not patentable.
For over a century, courts tested the validity of patent claims based
on congressional statutes requiring novelty and utility29 and the third
judicially created non-obviousness standard. a
In Cuno Engineering
Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.,31 the Court stated "[t]he principle of
the Hotchkiss case applies to the adaptation or combination of old or well
known devices for new uses. 3 2 Further, the Court held that "the new
device, however useful it may be, must
reveal the flash of creative genius
33
not merely the skill of the calling."
Under the flash of creative genius test, patents were not granted for
new inventions "if the 'result claimed as new is the same in character as
the original result[,]' even though the new result had not before been
contemplated. 3 4 As the Court had done almost one hundred years prior,
it interpreted the non-obviousness doctrine in the absence of legislative
action. Eventually, Congress passed two statutes that included provi-

22.
See Christopher A. Harkins, Fending Off Paper Patents and Patent Trolls: A Novel
"Cold Fusion" Defense Because Changing Times Demand It, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 407, 41922 (2007).
23.
See John H. Barton, Non-Obviousness, 43 IDEA 475, 476 (2003).
24.
Id.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
Id. at 264.
Id. at 266.
See Harkins, supra note 22, at 419-22.

30.

See id

31.
32.
33.
34.

314 U.S. 84 (1941).
Id.at91.
Id.
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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sions for non-obviousness and that remained the primary statutory authority of modern patent law.35
1. The Patent Act of 195236
In the late 1940s, patent law reformers concerned with the strict
flash of creative genius test put pressure on Congress to update U.S. patent law.37 To remedy this concern, Congress codified the Supreme
Court's Hotchkiss standard for non-obviousness 3 8 in the Patent Act of
1952. 39 This statute requires all inventors applying for a patent to prove
their invention was a non-obvious advance over the prior art to obtain a
valid patent. 4° Thus, as a policy matter, Congress superseded the flash of
creative genius test with a statutory non-obviousness element.
41
2. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1966)

In 1966, Congress passed Title 35 of the United States Code, requiring "an applicant to show that his [or her] invention is useful, novel, and
non-obvious in order to obtain a patent. ''42 With respect to obviousness,
35 U.S.C. § 103 provides that an inventor seeking a patent must prove a
person having ordinary skill in the art would not find the invention obvious in light of the prior art.43 Therefore, § 103 bars patent issuance when
"the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.'.
3. The Patent Reform Act of 200741
Notably, on April 18, 2007, Congress introduced "patent reform
legislation in the 'Patent Reform Act of 2007.' If signed into law, the
legislation would bring the biggest, most sweeping changes to U.S. patent law in over 50 years.' 6 However, "early reports suggest that the
Patent Reform Act of 2007 is hitting some snags and may not pass without amendments to or deletions of certain sections .... ,,47

35.

See infra Parts I.A. 1 and I.A.2 for a brief discussion of both current congressional statutes.

36.

Patent (Bryson) Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 10, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended

at 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (2007)).
37. Barton, supra note 23, at 476 (citing Cuno, 314 U.S. at 91).
38. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (II How.) 248 (1850).
39. Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792.
40. Packin, supra note 1, at 964 (citing Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792).
41.
35 U.S.C.A. § 103.
42. Packin, supra note 1, at 964.
43.
35 U.S.C.A § 103.
44.

Id.

45.
46.
47.

Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908 and S. 1145, 110th Cong. (ist Sess. 2007).
Harkins, supra note 22, at 422.
ld. at 423.
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Regardless, the proposed legislation does not address any potential
issues of non-obviousness arising out of Teleflex because the legislation
was drafted prior to the Teleflex decision. The proposed Patent Reform
Act of 2007 lists non-obviousness as a condition for patentability and
provides for the following amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 103:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained though the
claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section
102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art
are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention
pertains. Patentability shall
not be negated by the manner in which
48
the invention was made.
However, in this proposed amendment, Congress did not address any
specific test for the judicial application of non-obviousness. As this
comment will discuss in Part IV, Congress has an opportunity with the
Patent Reform Act of 2007 to clarify the broad non-obviousness standard
set forth by the Court.
B. JudicialInterpretationof PatentLaw Statutes and Creationof NonObviousness Tests
Judicial interpretation became an integral part of the nonobviousness doctrine, especially for combination patents. The Supreme
Court preserved the authority of Hotchkiss49 even after Congress solidified non-obviousness as a requirement for patent issuance.5 ° Specifically, the Court has employed three tests to further define and guide the
non-obvious doctrine: (1) the synergy test for all patents; (2) the Graham
test for combination patents; and (3) the TSM test for combination patents.
5
1. The Synergy Test '

Prior to the Patent Act of 1952,52 the Supreme Court established the
synergy test for combination patents because, by their nature, "the combination of existing elements failed to achieve unusual or surprising consequences as the elements did not perform any additional or different
function in the combination than they perform out of it."'5 3 The synergy
test developed as a special lens to examine the obviousness of combina48.
H.R. 1908 § 3(c).
49.
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
50.
Packin, supra note 1, at 968.
51.
Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1950)
(introducing the synergy test).
52.
Patent (Bryson) Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 10, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended
at 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (2007)).
53.
Packin, supra note 1, at 968 (quoting GreatAti. & Pac. Tea Co., 340 U.S. at 152 (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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tion patents.5 4 Simply put, the synergy test takes a functional approach
to assess patent validity: a combination patent is not obvious if the patent
produces "a new or different function." 55 The Court explained further
that under the synergy test, a patent applicant can demonstrate nonobviousness by showing "synergistic effects. 56
Following the enactment of § 103, the Court continued to apply and
elaborate on the synergy test. 57 The Court expounded that the "functional synergy test presumes invalidity of a combination patent unless
58
there is a synergistic effect of the elements in the combination claim.

Thus, current application of the synergy test requires an examination of
each individual element of the combination patent followed by a final
examination of the combined invention.5 9
2. The Graham60 Test

Fourteen years after Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 103, in the Graham case, the Court heard an obviousness issue requiring statutory interpretation of § 103.61 In this seminal decision, the Court interpreted the
language of § 103 and established the framework for an objective, factorbased test for obviousness.62 The Court held:
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to
be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background the obviousness or nonobviousness
[sic] of the subject matter is determined. Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of
surothers, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances
63
rounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.
The Graham test encompasses this factor-based analysis; if the subject
matter of the patent is conclusively obvious, the patent claim is invalid.6 4
As a policy matter, the Court reasoned that consideration of these
secondary factors was essential to the constitutional foundations of the

54. Id. at 969.
55.
Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 60 (1969) (quoting
Lincoln Eng'g Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303 U.S. 545, 549 (1938) (internal quotation marks
omitted))
56. Packin, supra note 1, at 969 (citing Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976)).
57. See, e.g., Sakraida, 425 U.S. at 282; Anderson's-Black Rock, 396 U.S. at 61-63; United
States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 48, 50-52 (1966).
58.
Packin, supra note 1, at 969 (citing Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 363, 379-80 (2001)).
59. Id.
60.
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
61.
Id. at3.
62.
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 1727, 1734 (2007).
63.
Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18.
64.
Teleflex, 127 S.Ct. at 1734.

20071

KSR INT'L CO. V. TELEFLEX, INC.

non-obviousness doctrine, 65 namely, promoting "the Progress of Science
and useful Arts. 6 6 The Court further proclaimed the original legal standards set forth in Hotchkiss remained valid, undisturbed precedent bolstered by the Graham test.67 Additionally, the Graham test provided "a
broad inquiry and invited courts ...to look at any secondary considerations that would prove instructive. 6 8 The latter policy reflects the loosening of the judicial standard for the non-obviousness doctrine.
3. The Teaching, Suggestion, or Motivation ("TSM") Test
In 1982, Congress created the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") to handle patent law cases. 69 The
Federal Circuit was created for three purposes: "ending forum-shopping
in patent suits, settling differences in patent-law doctrines among the
circuits, and allowing a single forum to develop the expertise needed to70
rule on complex technological questions that arise in patent suits."
"Seeking to resolve the obviousness question with more uniformity and
consistency," the Federal Circuit independently developed the TSM test
as a third approach to non-obviousness. 7' The TSM test requires a patent
applicant to demonstrate "a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine known elements in order to show that the combination is obvious. 72
Under this approach, a patent claim is obvious when "'some motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art teachings' can be found in
the prior art, the nature of the problem, or the knowledge of a person
having ordinary skill in the art." 73 This test is useful to "identify a reason
that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field
to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does. 74
In summary, Congress passed two statutes that currently control
patent claims, the Patent Act of 1952 and 35 U.S.C. § 103. Both statutes
require evidence of non-obviousness for patent issuance. In addition,
Congress recently proposed the Patent Reform Act of 2007 to further
65.
Barton, supra note 23, at 477.
66.
U.S CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl.8.
67.
Packin, supra note 1, at 968.
68.
Teleflex, 127 S. Ct. at 1739 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17(1966)).
69.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1570 (8th ed. 2004) (defining the Federal Circuit as "[a]n
intermediate-level appellate court with jurisdiction to hear appeals in patent cases .... The court
originated in the 1982 merger of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the U.S. Court of
Claims ...").
70.
Id.
71.
Teleflex, 127 S.Ct. at 1734.
72.
Id.at 1741. The TSM test was created by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals to
provide helpful insight to combination patents. Id.;
see also Application of Bergel, 48 C.C.P.A.
1102, 956-57 (1961) (holding that a specific chemotherapy compound is patentable because a prior
suggestion that it may be possible to combine known compounds to inhibit tumor growth did not
also suggest the desirability of combining those known compounds.).
73.
Teleflex, 127 S. Ct. at 1734 (quoting Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 132324 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
74.
Id. at 1741.
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reform modern patent law, but the new legislation does not address the
appropriate standard for non-obviousness analysis. Further, the judiciary
has independently developed three analytical tests for the nonobviousness element: the synergy test, the Graham test, and the TSM
test. With a basic understanding of the legislative and judicial history of
the non-obviousness doctrine, this comment will shift its focus to the
landmark Teleflex case.
II. KSR INTERNATIONAL

CO. V. TELEFLEX INC.

In KSR InternationalCo. v. Teleflex Inc., the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the Federal Circuit's rigid application of the TSM test
for obviousness, 75 and reaffirmed the historical pedigree and current applicability of its broader approach to obviousness. 76
A. Facts
In 1999, petitioner KSR International Company ("KSR") designed
and patented an adjustable accelerator pedal system for automobiles with
cable-actuated throttles." In 2001, Respondent Teleflex Incorporated
("Teleflex"), a competitor, obtained the exclusive license to the Engelgau
combination patent,78 describing an adjustable accelerator pedal system
for automobiles with electronically-actuated throttles, including an electronic sensor fixed to the pivot of the pedal. 79 However, in 2000, to meet
growing industry demands, KSR modified its design by adding a modular sensor to its adjustable pedal system for compatibility with vehicles
using computer-controlled throttles.80
Following KSR's modification and subsequent refusal to enter into
a royalty agreement, Teleflex sued KSR for infringing the Engelgau patent.81 In a motion for summary judgment, KSR argued that the Engelgau
combination patent was invalid because the design was obvious "in light
of the prior art in existence when the claimed subject matter was invented. ' 82
,
To determine the validity of the Engelgau patent, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan applied the
Graham framework and the TSM test.83 After finding KSR satisfied
both tests, the district court granted summary judgment in favor
of KSR,
84
holding that the Engelgau combination patent was obvious.
75.
Id.at 1739.
76.
See id at 1739-41.
77. U.S. Patent No. 6,151,976 (filed July 16, 1999).
78.
U.S. Patent No. 6,237,565 (filed Aug. 22, 2000).
79.
Teleflex, 127 S. Ct. at 1736-37.
80. Id. at 1735-36.
81.
Id at 1737.
82.
Id. at 1737-38.
83.
Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 581, 587-96 (E.D. Mich. 2003), vacated
and remanded, 119 F. App'x 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007).
84.
Id.at 596.
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court decision
and held that the trial court did not apply a strict enough application of
the TSM test. 85 Departing from Supreme Court precedent, the Federal
Circuit took a narrow view of obviousness, reasoning "that courts and
patent examiners should look only to the problem the patentee was trying
to solve. 8 6 The Federal Circuit further held that expert testimony as to
non-obviousness raised genuine issues of material fact that precluded
summary judgment.87 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.88
B. The Supreme Court's Holding
In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme
Court reversed the Federal Circuit. 89 The Court identified four errors in
the Federal Circuit's strict TSM analysis. 90 First, the Court held the
"particular motivation [or] the avowed purpose of the patentee" does not
control, rather "the objective reach of the claim" or "whether the combination was obvious to a person with ordinary skill in the art" controls. 91
Second, it held the Federal Circuit was incorrect in assuming "a person
of ordinary skill attempting to solve a problem" will utilize only certain
elements of the prior art. 92 Moreover, the Court stated a person of ordinary skill is creative, fitting "the teachings of multiple patents together
like pieces of a puzzle. 9 3
Third, the Court held the Federal Circuit erred in concluding "a patent claim cannot be proved obvious merely by showing that the combination of elements was 'obvious to try.' ' ' 9 4 Instead, the Court explained
that "a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp" when the market applies pressure
for new designs.95 Fourth, the Court held the Federal Circuit erred in
arguing that courts and patent examiners risk "falling prey to hindsight
bias. 96 Although the Supreme Court recognized that hindsight bias is a
problem, the Court reasoned that strict "preventative rules that deny fact-

85.
Teleflex, 127 S.Ct. at 1738; see also Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F. App'x 282,
288 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2006).
86.
Teleflex, 127 S.Ct. at 1742 (citing KSR, 119 F. App'x at 288).
87.
KSR, 119 F. App'x at 289-90.
88. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 126 S.Ct. 2965, 2966 (2006).
89.
Teleflex, 127 S.Ct. at 1735.
90.
Id.at 1741-42. The Court also noted that since the decision in the instant matter, the
Federal Circuit has adopted a broader conception of the TSM test. Id. at 1743; see, e.g., DyStar
Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1367 (2006) ("Our
suggestion test is in actuality quite flexible ....
");Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286,
1291 (2006) ("There is flexibility in our obviousness jurisprudence .....
91.
Teleflex, 127 S. Ct. at 1741-42.
92.
Id. at 1742.
93.
Id.
94.
Id.(quoting Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F. App'x 282, 289 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2006)).
95.
Id.
96.
Id.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

finders recourse to common sense
97
case law nor consistent with it."

. . .

[Vol. 85:2

are neither necessary under our

Contemporaneously, the Court reinforced its principal reason for
disallowing combination patent claims for what is obvious: "[A] patent
for a combination which only unites old elements with no change in their
respective functions... obviously withdraws what is already known into
the field of its monopoly and diminishes the resources available to skillful men." 98 The Court held the Engelgau patent claim was invalid as
obvious because "mounting a modular sensor on a fixed pivot point...
was a design step well within the grasp of a person of ordinary skill in
the relevant art." 99

Based on precedent addressing non-obvious combination patent
claims, 00 the Court framed the appropriate issue as "whether the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions."'' 1 The Court reasoned that "[i]f a
person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103
likely bars its patentability."' 02 In this case, the Court noted the pedal
systems market created an increased demand to convert mechanical pedals to electronic pedals, and the prior art described many methods of
conversion.' 0 3 Furthermore, the Court held KSR's combination of established patent elements sufficiently supported the finding of obviousness
because the claim resulted from common sense and ordinary skill, not
innovation.l°4
Finally, the Court expounded that summary judgment was the appropriate procedural device and held that "[t]he ultimate judgment of
obviousness is a legal determination."' 0' 5 This holding refuted the Federal Circuit's separate argument for reversing the district court on the
grounds that summary judgment was inappropriate based on expert testimony. 10 6 The Federal Circuit's judgment reversing the summary judgment of invalidity was itself reversed by the Supreme Court, and the case
was remanded for further proceedings.'0 7

97. Id.at 1742-43.
98. Id.at 1739 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v.
Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1950)).
99. Id. at1746.
100. See, e.g., Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976); Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v.
Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969); United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966).
101.
Teleflex, 127 S.Ct. at 1740.
102. Id.
103. 1d.at1744
104. See id at1743-46.
105.
Id.at 1745-46 (citing Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,17 (1966)).
106.
Id.(noting that expert testimony should certainly be considered regarding questions of
fact, but the final
legal judgment isthat of the court).
107. Id. at1746.
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In the wake of Teleflex, the precise impact of the Court's broad nonobviousness standard is unknown. The remainder of this comment will
explore the potential legal, social, and economic effects of the Teleflex
decision. Also, Part III will explain a new test as an alternative to the
Teleflex standard.
III. ANALYSIS
On the surface, the Teleflex Court established a defined analysis for
the non-obviousness doctrine. 10 8 The resulting two-pronged test for nonobviousness combined statutes and judicial tests into one comprehensive
analysis. In the context of combination patents, the decision to reverse
the Federal Circuit was proper because it reconciled the inconsistency of
a strict test for non-obviousness, while fostering "new works based on
instinct, simple logic, ordinary inferences, extraordinary ideas, and sometimes even genius.',' 0 9 The following analysis discusses the potential
beneficial impact of the recent Teleflex decision and the emerging broad
non-obviousness doctrine, despite some negative effects on small businesses and independent innovators.
A. The Legal Implicationsof the Supreme Court's Decision
The Supreme Court's broad non-obviousness standard is likely to
have ramifications on patent law. Most importantly, the Teleflex decision will alter patent law by decreasing the overall number of patents
issued. Additionally, the decision demonstrates the Court's reverence for
stare decisis over the independent judgment of the Federal Circuit.
1. Decreased Patent Issuance
The first beneficial legal implication of the Teleflex decision is administrative. "The decision lowers the bar for proving obviousness.
Parties charged with infringement will have a stronger legal basis for
invalidating patents, particularly on summary judgment."'110 Logically, if
the Supreme Court's broad test makes it more difficult to demonstrate
the element of non-obviousness, then fewer patents will be issued and
more will be held invalid. Teleflex "promises to create a stir in the industry by making it easier for defendants to prove invalidity, and thereby
suggesting a transition of making it harder obtain (and preserve the validity of) patents based on the combination of known elements.""'

108.
109.
110.
ORANGE
111.

Id.
Id.
Irfan A. Lateef & Joshua Stowell, Special Feature: A Supreme End to Patent Trolls?, 49
COUNTY LAW. 18, 22 (2007).
Harkins, supra note 22, at 467.
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The new test also advances the federal policy of promoting innovation and rewarding true innovators with monopolistic patent rights.1 1 2 A
higher non-obviousness standard, coupled with the expenses of patent
applications, will create incentives for inventors to make genuine inventions and deter applications for less innovative inventions. Furthermore,
"the decision decreases the impact
of threatened patent suits, especially
' 13
when weak patents are at issue.
In contrast, the Federal Circuit's rigid TSM approach "ignores exogenous economic or technological changes, which make something
obvious suddenly valuable." '1 14 A lower standard for non-obviousness
would create an incentive for inventors "to apply for many 'obvious'
combinations, which increases the economic burden that the system imposes on a free market."' 15 On the other hand, the new higher standard
may produce excess litigation between parties fighting over the nonobviousness element."1 6 Ultimately, the Supreme Court's standard articulated in Teleflex will encourage innovation by rewarding inventors
who are genuinely original.
2. Stare Decisis
Another beneficial legal impact of the Teleflex decision is the victory for stare decisis. The Court unanimously refused to deviate from
precedent established over one hundred and fifty years ago." 7 Although
the concept of non-obviousness and the tests for non-obviousness developed over time," 18 the underlying policies set forth in Hotchkiss have not.
Grounding its decision in the Constitution, the Supreme Court's holding
in Teleflex reflects the underlying policy for the promotion and progression of useful arts.119

Although the Supreme Court adhered to precedent, the Federal Circuit has been critical of the Supreme Court's synergy test. 120 Presumably
relying on its expertise in patent law, the Federal Circuit applied a strict
TSM test because the synergy test invites hindsight bias. 12 1 But critics
suggest the Federal Circuit's strict approach "essentially reduce[d] the
112.
Id. at 468 ("Buoyed by policies of promoting innovation and the progress of science on
the one hand, without the high price paid to legitimate competition on the other, one senses a return
to the notion that an inventor must actually have invented something before being rewarded a patent
monopoly[.]").

113.
Lateef & Stowell, supra note 110, at 22.
114.
Packin, supra note 1, at 977.
115.
Id.
116.
See infra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of the cost barriers for small businesses.
117.
See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
118.
See supra Part I for discussion of the rise of non-obviousness.
119.
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1746 (2007).
120.
Packin, supra note 1, at 979 ("The Federal Circuit has criticized the Supreme Court's
synergy test because it invites ... the possibility that even though an invention is non-obvious and
therefore patentable, when viewed in retrospect in light of the prior art, a person of ordinary skill in
the art may use hindsight in determining that the invention is obvious.").
121.
Id. at 980.
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'level of ordinary skill' to nothing . . .[and] assume[d] no common
knowledge."'' 22 In the end, the Supreme Court's application of the synergy test "has been said
to be better suited for defining obviousness in
123
combination patents."'
However, the Federal Circuit's departure from Supreme Court
precedent implies a serious need for reform in patent law.' 24 Since the
Supreme Court's reversal, the Federal Circuit has moved away from a
rigid TSM test because the strict application "sets a low standard for pat25
Ultientability and encourages patenting rather than innovation."',
mately, the Federal Circuit's deviation prior to the Court's Teleflex decision does little to hinder the victory of stare decisis, but it does provide
an educated alternative for where the bar for non-obviousness should be
set.
Remarkably, the Federal Circuit is not alone in criticizing the Supreme Court for setting a "higher bar for combination patents than for
other types of patents."'' 26 The Federal Circuit applied a stricter application of the TSM test to broaden the non-obviousness analysis to all types
of patents, thereby providing consistency. 27 Although the Court's decision abrogates the previous Federal Circuit test, the competing views of
each court necessitate clarification by Congress regarding the appropriateness of the Supreme Court's new standard for non-obviousness.
B. The Social and Economic Implications of the Teleflex Decision
Only future studies will determine the long term social and economic impact of the Teleflex decision. 28 However, the underlying constitutional policies behind the Supreme Court's holding should shape the
impact of its decision, particularly in the areas of innovation and monopoly, and barriers to small businesses.

122. Id.(internal quotations omitted).
123.
Id.(citing Lunney, supra note 58, at 390).
124. Id.at 979-80.
125.
Id. at 977; see also Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350,
1363 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (applying the Supreme Court's broad Teleflex standard and holding the patent
at issue invalid for failing to overcome a prima facie case for obviousness).
126. Packin, supra note 1, at 979; see also Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572
(1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing the non-obviousness standard is too high and declaring "the
only patent that is valid is one which the Court has not been able to get its hands on"); Homer J.
Schneider, Non-Obviousness, the Supreme Court, and the Prospectsfor Stability, 60 J. PAT. OFF.
SoC'Y 304, 318 (1978) (stating application "of the non-obviousness test is muddied, not clarified, by
unexplained resort to... searches for 'synergism"').
127. Packin, supra note 1, at 976.
128. For the purposes of this comment, any foreign social and economic implications will not
be addressed, but should be topic for another scholarly comment. Recently, a "bipartisan effort in
Congress to overhaul the patent system ... is hitting resistance because of concerns the U.S. might
be exposed to greater foreign competition." Greg Hitt, Patent System's Revamp Hits Wall, WALL
ST. J.(Wash., D.C.), Aug. 27, 2007, at A3.
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1. Innovation and Monopoly
The fine balance of promoting innovation and protecting the right to
profit from invention underscores all of patent law.' 29 In Teleflex, the
Supreme Court found an equilibrium between these two competing goals
by rewarding genuine innovations with patents and denying patents for
uncreative inventors who fail the non-obviousness test. 30 Although
these policies are fundamentally different, the requirement for patent
validity provides a filter for truly innovative patents.
2. Barriers for Small Businesses
Notably, the high costs accompanying compliance with U.S. patent
law perpetuate a sweeping negative impact on small businesses and independent inventors. 131 The largest barrier for small businesses and independent inventors is the high litigation costs necessary to enforce patents against large corporations. 132 Also, "less-tangible costs related to
patent protection"'' 33 create further barriers for small entities, including
high filing costs, 134 patent insurance costs, 135 drafting and prosecutionrelated costs, 136 and opportunity costs. 137 In totality, these additional

costs average a minimum total of $22,785.00 plus unrecoverable, intangible costs.

38

Thus, these costs minimize the economic incentives for

innovation by small businesses and inventors.
Although the holding in Teleflex does not address these small business concerns, Congress should arguably reform patent laws to provide
additional protection for the small entity innovators. The strongest area
of patent law demanding reform for small businesses is litigation. 39 35
U.S.C. § 282 addresses challenges to patent validity, stating that "a patent shall be presumed valid."'' 40 First, Congress can expand § 282 to
include reasonable expert witness fees because the statute already provides for "reasonable attorney fees."' 141 Second, Congress can remove
the reduction cap on attorney fees when small entities prevail in patent

129.
130.
131.

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.1, 8.
See KSR Int'l Co., v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S.Ct. 1727, 1743 (2007).
See Jeff A. Ronspies, Does David Need a New Sling? Small Entities Face a Costly Bar-

rier to Patent Protection,4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 184 (2004).

132.
Id.at 196-99; see also Robert E. Thomas, Vanquishing Copyright Pirates and Patent
Trolls: The Divergent Evolution of Copyright and Patent Laws, 43 AM. Bus. L.J. 689, 703-06
(2006).
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Ronspies, supra note 131, at 195.
Id.
Id.at 199-200.
Id.at 200-01.
Id.at 201-02.

138.
Id.at 195-202; see also AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N, 2003 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC
SURVEY 22 (2003) (stating the median estimates for costs).
139.
Ronspies, supra note 131, at 207-11.
140.
35 U.S.C.A. § 282 (2007).
141.
Ronspies, supra note 131, at 207.
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litigation.1 42 Third, Congress can mandate small-entity litigants in patent
disputes to attend arbitration, rather than pursue costly litigation. 14' Each
of these suggestions would help to reduce the costly barriers for small
entities, thus encouraging innovation for small businesses and independent inventors. Congress must explore these ideas because they are highly
policy based determinations, outside the scope of the Supreme Court's
powers.
IV. DEMAND FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

Continued judicial definition of combination patent law through
case law interpretation is unnecessary. The most appropriate and direct
course of action is to call upon Congress to reform the non-obviousness
test, rather than to synthesize historic case law under the broad umbrella
of the non-obviousness standard. The Court established the broad Teleflex analysis for non-obviousness in the absence of any direction from
Congress. However, non-obviousness analysis needs further clarification
because the determination of non-obviousness involves a policy discussion more appropriately suited for the legislative branch.
One glaring opportunity for Congress to address the appropriateness
of the Supreme Court's new test is in the Patent Reform Act of 2007.
With the proposed legislation meeting some resistance, 144 Congress can
still create a provision choosing to either: (1) codify the new broad Teleflex standard; (2) amend or modify the Teleflex standard; or (3) create a
different standard depending on the outcome of the much needed policy
discussion. As a starting point, and based on the previously conflicting
views between the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court, Congress
simply needs to have the dialogue to determine the most appropriate
analysis for non-obviousness. Then, Congress can decide which option
would best serve the needs of patent law.
For an example of an alternative to the Court's test, Tamir Packin
has suggested the "economic synergy" test for non-obviousness.1 45 Taking a purely economic approach, Congress may consider adopting a
variation of the proposed economic synergy test, which provides "that a
combination should be found non-obvious if the economic value of the
combination as a whole is greater than the economic value of the sum of
its parts."' 146 This test relies on market demands to set the economic
value of inventions. "[T]he new combination cannot simply redistribute
.. in the existing demand curves, but must itself create a new demand..

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 207-08.
Id. at 210-11.
Harkins, supra note 22, at 423.
Packin, supra note 1, at 981-90.
ld. at 982.
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The social benefit of certain mathematical calculations for value
increases the efficiency of the combination patent application process.
• .,147

As suggested by Pakin, the economic synergy test is superior to the
Supreme Court's synergy test in three ways. First, the Court's synergy
test assumes "those combinations that do not create a functional synergy
are not valuable to society."' 148 The economic alternative recognizes that
some combinations lacking a functional synergy may still have some
utilitarian value.149 Second, the economic synergy test is inclusive of the
Court's approach because "all functionally synergistic combinations will
also be economically synergistic and therefore patentable." 150 Finally,
the economic synergy test provides economic incentives for "inventors
who create functionally simple devices that benefit society" by adding
economic value.' 5 ' In response to the criticisms of the Supreme Court's
high standard of non-obviousness, the economic synergy test is one conceivable alternative addressing the call for patent reform. However,
adopting this test would deviate from Supreme Court precedent requiring
an abandonment of the established synergy test.
In sum, Congress must determine the appropriate test for nonobviousness by discussing different policies behind non-obviousness
analysis, exploring different options and alternatives to the Court's new
test, and deciding the most appropriate analysis. In light of the recent
reaffirmation of the synergy test by the Teleflex Court, the most appropriate course of action is for Congress to address the appropriate test for
non-obviousness. Legislative action would set a definitive statutory test,
without forcing the Court to continuously set policy standards.
CONCLUSION

In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,152 the Supreme Court
unanimously established a clear two-pronged test for non-obviousness,
an essential element to obtain a combination patent. 53 The broad, high
standard incorporates the policies and tests developed cautiously
throughout U.S. patent law history. 154 The Court created a standard reflecting the legislative intent of Congress, while simultaneously adhering
to precedent. 155 Looking to the future, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the non-obviousness doctrine in Teleflex will promote innovation,

147.
Id. at 982 n.151; see generally MARK A. GLICK, LARA A. REYMANN & RICHARD
HOFFMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DAMAGES: GUIDELINES AND ANALYSIS 43-72 (2003).
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Packin, supra note 1, at 984.
Id.
Id. (noting the consistency with the constitutional goal of promoting progress).
Id.at 986.
127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741-43 (2007).

153.

id.

154.
155.

See id at 1739-43.
See id.
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while rewarding worthy inventors with exclusive patent rights. 56 Despite these steps forward, other methods remain for effectively addressing the non-obviousness standard, but it would require congressional
reform outside of the scope of the judicial branch.
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